US-UK joint attacks in Yemen draw experts’ deep scrutiny

TDT | Manama                                                     

The Daily Tribune – www.newsofbahrain.com

The US and UK joint strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen sparked a flurry of questions and assessments from experts at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), highlighting the operation’s complexities and potential ramifications.

Assessing the Strike’s Scope and Impact

Fabian Hinz, Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis at IISS The US military stated that it had attacked about 60 targets in several regions in Yemen, including command and control nodes, munition storage sites, launchers, production facilities and air defence systems.

The scope of the attack makes clear that this was not merely a symbolic strike but an attempt to seriously degrade Houthi anti-shipping capabilities.

However, the types of systems used by the Houthis for their attacks in the Red Sea are relatively compact, mostly mobile and can be dispersed and concealed relatively easily. It therefore remains uncertain what percentage of Houthi anti-ship missile and UAV systems the joint British-American system managed to neutralize.

Sustaining Naval Presence and Maritime Trade

Nick Childs, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at IISS This is clearly seen internationally as a major threat to global maritime trade and an issue of freedom of navigation. But all navies are stretched.

Both the US Navy and the UK Royal Navy will be hard-pressed to maintain their current commitment indefinitely and their ships are spread quite thin as it is in terms of the potential area of sea at risk.

How long such a mission can be sustained will depend on how many other governments and navies are also ready to take a meaningful share of the burden.

Another issue is how the threat may evolve.

And for all there is the question of whether continuing to denude their resources in ships and missiles in a defensive mission is sensible, or whether other measures like further air and missile strikes are necessary.

All this adds to the potential stresses and strains on governments as they judge how to respond now. The shipping industry, too, will be looking at how the threat develops.

There is a debate over what impact a prolonged disruption will have on the global economy, and the extent to which the shipping community will adapt.

That could include returning to using the Red Sea if the threat can be returned to acceptable levels.

In the end, this is a major shipping route, and there are stakes involved well beyond the region that will bear on calculations of what needs to be done to keep it open and safe.

Escalation Risks and Houthi Deterrence

Sir Tom Beckett, Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

Notwithstanding the chance of miscalculation leading to escalation, from the Axis of Resistance standpoint, Tehran is likely to be thinking two things: 1) what will regional escalation mean directly for Iran (will it be attacked, by whom, from where, at what targets, at what scale, and for what duration) and indirectly how will escalation further Tehran’s goal to drive the US from the ME regions; and 2) how will escalation further Iran’s goal to destroy the State of Israel.

It is hard to see how it can be optimistic about either. Perhaps more important for Iran currently, will be to pressure Iraq to expel US forces.

This would be a ‘strategic victory’ as part of 1) above. The Saudi led coalition had two aims for the Yemen campaign. To restore the ‘legitimate’ government of Yemen and, consequently, to defend Saudi territory.

To achieve this, it needed to achieve a level of territorial control of Yemen, which it has failed to do.

The US/UK and aligned OPG countries do not need to do this. Airstrikes over time could force behaviour change by the Houthi in a way that defensive action in the Red Sea was not achieving.

Regional Reaction, Especially from Gulf States

Hasan AlHasan, Senior Fellow for Middle East

Policy at IISS Traditional US partners in the region including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkiye have issued statements over the past 24 hours expressing concern over the potential for US and UK strikes against the Houthis in Yemen to lead to further escalation in the region.

While the Gulf states recognize the need to maintain the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, they appear to believe that a de-escalatory pathway involving a ceasefire in Gaza would lead to an overall lowering of the temperature in the region including the Red Sea.

This suggests that the US and UK’s attempt to paint the conflict in the Red Sea as being wholly unconnected to the war in Gaza has so far been unsuccessful in the region. Bahrain, which is playing an active role in supporting US and UK military operations logistically, is the only exception to this regional trend so far.

Bahrain’s position can be explained by its recent signing of a CSIPA agreement with the US, its traditional role in hosting the US Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, and September 2023 attack by the Houthis that killed five Bahrain servicemen in southern Saudi Arabia.